26.02.10 Menas Associates Algeria: Why was Ali Tounsi assassinated?

Ali Tounsi

There are three possibilities about why Algeria's national police chief Ali Tounsi was assassinated on 25th February of which two are in the public domain. The first, officially put out by government sources, was that the assassin acted in a 'fit of madness'. That can be totally discounted.

The second, explained in varying degrees of detail in most Algerian media, is that Tounsi's killing was the result of a personal row between the police chief and his assassin, Lt. Colonel Oultache Chouaib.

Ali Tounsi and Chouaib had known each other for years. According to this version of events, Tounsi had persuaded Chouaib to come out of retirement a few years ago to head the police's new helicopter unit. However, Tounsi, so we are told, was keen to stamp out corruption and had identified Chouaib as being corrupt; dismissing him accordingly the day before the assassination. Echorouk, for example, reported that an investigation recently ordered by Tounsi into contracts signed with suppliers of helicopter spare parts and computer equipment had revealed the involvement of the assassin in 'shady transactions'.

This led to a confrontation between the two the next morning, with Chouaib apparently confronting Tounsi and asking why he had brought him out of retirement only to send him to a prison cell. In this version of events, the actual details of the assassination are unclear. There is general agreement that Tounsi was shot, five times allegedly, by Chouaib. However, there are conflicting reports as to whether Tounsi fired back and wounded his assassin; whether other people were in the office at the time and were also wounded or shot back; or whether Chouaib turned the gun on himself.

Most reports indicate that one and possibly two others in the room, including a security official, were injured before Chouaib turned the gun on himself. Either way, Chouaib is reported to have been taken to hospital in a serious state, reportedly in a coma. Some agencies have reported that he is dead, although this has not yet been officially confirmed and our own sources (see below) indicate that he is still alive.

The third possibility comes from our own sources, which suggest that Tounsi's death may well have been a 'political assassination' undertaken by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's 'clan'. Before outlining the evidence for this, we should remind readers of Tounsi's position in the current fight between the presidency and the DRS.

As Algeria Politics & Security explained several weeks ago, Tounsi has long been a central figure in the developing struggle between the presidency and the DRS. Tounsi was 'Mediène's man'. In July 2009, Interior Minister Yazid Zerhouni dismissed Tounsi on behalf of Bouteflika, only for DRS chief General Mohamed Mediène to have him reinstated three days later, saying, “Mudjahidine never leave their posts”.

The evidence for a 'political assassination' is based on the facts and questions that have been raised and given to us by our sources in Algeria. They differ from the second, popular and credible version, outlined above.

In the update that we sent to subscribers yesterday in the immediate wake of the assassination, we said that the DGSN building was surrounding by a number of possible army, police and gendarmerie units, and that shooting was take place. Our sources have confirmed to us that 13 officers were injured in that shooting, raising the question of how one man, possibly seriously injured, could shoot so many others. The figure of 13 injured officers has been confirmed by one newspaper, the Arab-language Al Fadja, which has connections with the DRS. (Whether it will be withdrawn or closed down in the next few days is something to watch out for).

Such shooting would indicate that the assassin may not have been alone. There is also the question of how the assassin, a subordinate officer, was able to carry his loaded sidearm into the office of his superior. We are under the impression that, as in many other countries, this is simply not allowed in the Algerian services.

According to our sources, the assassin entered Tounsi's office, which we understand has double doors, and shot him. The double doors may well have muffled the sound. He then exited the office, and told the secretary that Tounsi wanted to see a number of other prominent people. These were duly summoned by the secretary. However, one of these noticed that the assassin's sidearm was 'out of place' and questioned him. It was at this point that the more extensive shooting began.

Our sources are also disinclined to believe that Chouaib tried to kill himself because suicide is not common in Arab culture. It is believed that this version has been promulgated to give it more credibility in the West. These same sources are inclined to believe that Zerhouni may have been complicit in the assassination. It has been drawn to our attention that Zerhouni's initial response statement to El Watan - saying that the assassin had a 'fit of madness' and killed Tounsi because of the corruption allegations against Chouaib - was issued with unseemly haste. This is most unusual for Algerian officials who are normally very slow and deliberate in issuing such statements. It has been suggested to us that Zerhouni had given El Watan a 'prepared statement' within minutes of the assassination.

Moreover, we have learnt that the assassin was not taken to a police hospital, which is surprising because there are good ones in the area, but to the Ain Naadja Military Hospital where he is now reported to be in the hands of the DRS. It can be presumed that the DRS, against whom this assassination seems to have been directed, will be doing all in their considerable power to find out exactly what happened and who, if anyone, was acting with or running Chouaib.

We also believe that the initial reports we received immediately after the killing that Tounsi was being accused of being a 'Harki' are very significant. This is a politically powerful and extremely loaded term in Algeria. The fact that the word's usage, confirmed again today, was put into the public domain, might have been a deliberate attempt by the assassins to give legitimacy to their action: namely, that they were still fighting the 'revolution' and 'eliminating French collaborators'.

Our information raises serious questions about the veracity of the 'official' version of events. However, it is by no means conclusive evidence that Zerhouni and the Bouteflika 'clan' were behind the assassination.

If the DRS can find any evidence of such, we can expect serious developments within the next few days.

Irrespective of the reasons for Tounsi's assassination, it will have profound implications, especially in the context of the current battle between the presidency and the DRS. His departure immediately shifts the balance of power between the two 'clans' substantially, from the DRS to the presidency. Whether this becomes effective, however, will depend on how the situation is perceived by the country's other forces, notably the army and gendarmerie.

The latest indications from our sources in Algiers are that the army, for the moment, is likely to stay on the sidelines. The army does not want to interfere, and has been trying to say that to both parties. If it does take sides and enter the fight, its reputation will be severely damaged, although its position is no longer based on its role as 'protector' of the people. That role was very publicly abdicated in the 1980s and 1990s. Rather, the Algerian army sees itself as the 'core' of the state; some would say 'it is the state'. To quote a well-known Algerian historian: “Every state has an army; the Algerian army has a state.”

The position of the gendarmerie, with 120,000 men at its disposal, is less clear. Its head, General Ahmed Boustila is generally regarded as an opportunist. He is likely to go with whichever side he sees getting the upper hand. If the effective control of the Police does now fall more directly under Zerhouni, Boustila may well see the balance of power shifting from the DRS to the presidency and align himself accordingly.

Unless the DRS is able in the next few days to come up with concrete, or otherwise persuasive, evidence of the Bouteflika clan's complicity in the assassination, it could find itself severely weakened. Should the Bouteflika 'clan' see this as the moment to press home its new-found advantage against it, perhaps by opening, as they have threatened, the dossiers on political assassinations, it is conceivable that we could see the complete dismantling of the DRS in its current form. The next few days are likely to be critical.

For more news and expert analysis about Algeria, please see Algeria Focus and Algeria Politics & Security.

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